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This thesis addresses the relative influence that public opinion and the current international 
situation have on the two portions of the budget dealing with national security: the defense and 
international affairs budgets. The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate the correlation between the two 
budgets and explain any variations. The hypothesis of the thesis is that international affairs budget is 
driven more by economic concerns of the nation and the defense budget is driven more by the national 
perception of the current international situation and of the external threats to the United States. This 
thesis also examines the debate over the influence of public opinion on public policy. It tests the 
assumption that public opinion influences the direction of policy, specifically the national security 
budget. 
A time-series regression analysis is run using the percentage of the total budget allocated to 
defense and international affairs budgets as two dependent variables. The independent variables 
included: the University of Michigan's Consumer Sentiment Index to measure the public's perception 
of the economy, several Gallup Poll questions to measure the public's perception of the nation's focus 
and perception of the international situation, and two measures (international tension and war) of the 
actual international situation. 
The conclusion of the study finds that public opinion does play an important role in the national 
security budget. The defense budget is clearly influenced by the public's concern over foreign issues as 
well as the measure of international tension and the state of war. The international affairs budget is 
affected by these variables (excluding war) to a slightly lesser extent. The effect of the public's economic 
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The national security agenda of the United States is not derived solely through an 
objective examination of the threat and a determination of the policies and military forces 
needed to counter that perceived danger. One of the main constraints on the national 
security policy is the size of the budget. Therefore, the influences on the budget must be 
factored into any strategic plan for national security. Since most of the national security 
budget is contained in the Department of Defense and the Department of State 
(International Affairs) functions listed in the budget, this thesis examines the driving 
factors behind the overall budget policy decisions regarding these budgets. 
With the growth of the nondiscretionary portion of the budget, discretionary funds 
are harder hit by pressure to cut the budget. The U. S. government's budget is an 
expression of priorities. The money allotted to a function shows the importance assigned 
to that aspect of the budget. The importance placed on national security by the nation is 
reflected in the funds allotted to the international affairs and national defense portion of 
the budget. Generally, the national defense and international affairs portions of the 
budget increase and decrease together; however, this is not always the case. This thesis 
examines how closely the defense and international affairs budgets correlate and proposes 
viable reasons for the differences that do occur. 
The budget process for both functions is similar in many respects. Their budget 
requests from the executive branch are founded on similar presumptions regarding the 
international environment and how that relates to U.S. security concerns and potential 
threats (as delineated by the President). The Congress also makes budget decisions based 
on its interpretation of the nation's concern over security threats. The final national 
security budget appropriated is driven by a number of factors including: (1) concerns 
regarding the direction or health of the national economy mobilizing a call for government 
action; (2) the general focus of the decision-makers and the voters on domestic or foreign 
issues; and (3) foreign policy outlook of the decision-makers and the voters, i.e., 






In seeking to explain different changes in the international affairs budget and the 
defense budget, this thesis postulates that international affairs budget is driven more by 
economic concerns of the nation and the defense budget is driven more by the national 
perception of the current international situation and of the external threats to the United 
States. The international affairs budget should be affected more by the state of the 
economy because Congress finds it difficult to approve programs that send U.S. tax 
dollars overseas during periods of economic hardship at home. The defense budget is 
easier to defend than foreign aid in a fiscally tight Congress because of the direct 
correlation between cuts in military expenditures (especially personnel and large contracts) 
and increased unemployment. Increases in the military budget usually are usually 
defended by addressing the perception of threat and the importance of foreign policy 
issues. 
Part of the hypothesis studied in this thesis is the influence of public opinion on 
policy. Public opinion's affect on policy decisions has been debated through the years. 
This thesis seeks to prove that public opinion does affect the final outcome of the budget. 
The results confirm most of the hypotheses of this thesis.    Public opinion does 
play a significant role in the priority given to the national security budget. The defense 
budget is clearly influenced by the nation's focus on foreign problems and the current 
international situation. The international affairs budget is also affected by the nation's 
focus on foreign issues (to a slightly lesser extent) and the current international situation. 
The public's concern about the economy did effect the national security budget, however, 
the data did not show any significant difference between its impact on the defense and the 
international affairs portions of the budget. 
Many studies had previously addressed the influences that the international 
situation had on the defense budget. This thesis shows that the defense budget is affected 
by changes in the international situation more than the international affairs budget. This 
influence is not simply derived from an assessment of the threat from the Soviet Union 
(i.e., Soviet military spending) as previous studies have shown There is a strong influence 
from a general tensions worldwide. This may help to provide a basis for estimating future 
       
      
  
   






budgets in this post cold war era where the threat from the old arch enemy, the Soviet 
Union, is no more. 
The effect of public opinion on the defense budget is strong, especially beginning 
in the late 1960s to present day. The nation's focus on foreign issues, the concern about 
the economy, and to a lesser extent the view of the U.S. role in world affairs contributes 
to the priority given to defense matters in the budget. These issues should be addressed 
by the Department of Defense in its public affairs policies and statements in order to 
increase support for defense spending. 
XI l
I. INTRODUCTION 
The national security agenda of a nation, especially a democracy, is not derived 
solely through an objective examination of the threat and a determination of the policies 
and forces needed to counter that perceived danger. Budgetary constraints affect security 
policymaking. This thesis examines how public opinion and perceptions of the 
international security environment affect the size of the U.S. national security budget, 
including the Department of Defense (national defense) and the Department of State 
(international affairs) functions of the budget. 
This thesis argues that defense and foreign assistance (a major portion of the 
international affairs budget) often compete for the same small pot of money. With the 
domestic nondiscretionary (i.e., entitlement) portion of the budget increasing, the 
discretionary funds are hit harder by pressure to cut the budget, further intensifying this 
competition. Defense and foreign assistance accounts usually rise and fall in tandem. This 
is not always the case, however. Using regression analysis of the budget and polling data 
in the opst-World War II era, I found that the defense budget is more sensitive than 
international affairs to the nation's concern about foreign issues. While other studies have 
shown that perceptions of the Soviet threat were a critical factor in driving defense 
budgets, my study shows that more general international security concerns were also 
significant. The importance of these non-Soviet concerns in affecting the amount of 
defense spending, and the budgetary significance of public opinion in general carry vital 
implications for the post-cold war era. 
A.        HYPOTHESIS 
The international affairs and defense functions of the budget compete for funding 
not only because they are both discretionary funds, but because many on Capitol Hill view 





Because this study's options are premised on the notion that foreign aid can 
serve some of the same goals as the Department of Defense, any increases in foreign 
assistance would be financed by reductions in spending for lower-priority aid 
programs and traditional military programs. {Emphasis added} (April 1994 
C.B.O. Study, p. xii.) 
This competition for funding is not only driven by rational analysis, but by politics. 
Wildavsky offers the classic argument fo the budget as a political process, and as the 
ratification of policy priorities: 
If politics is regarded in part as conflict over whose preferences shall 
prevail in the determination of national policy, then the budget records the outcomes 
of this struggle. If one asks, "Who gets what the government has to give?" then the 
answers for a moment in time are recorded in the budget. If one looks at politics as 
a process by which the government mobilizes resources to meet pressing problems. 
Then the budget is a focus of these efforts. (Aaron Wildavsky, 1984, p. 4) 
The importance placed on national security by the nation is reflected in the funds 
allotted to the international affairs and national defense portion of the budget. The budget 
process for both functions is similar in many respects. Their budget requests from the 
executive branch are founded on similar presumptions regarding the international 
environment and how that relates to U.S. security concerns and potential threats (as 
delineated by the President). The Congress also makes budget decisions based on its 
interpretation of the nation's concern over security threats. They must pass through 
similar bureaucratic budget processes and decision-making procedures regarding funding. 
All discretionary functions are constrained by a perceived total budget ceiling (a size limit 
for the budget which if surpassed would have detrimental effects on the economy.) The 
final budget appropriated is driven by a number of factors: 
* concerns regarding the direction or health of the national economy that may 
drive a call for government deficit reduction or stimulating the economy 
through increased government spending; 






* foreign policy outlook of the decision-makers and the voters, i.e., isolationist 
vs. internationalist and; 
* special interest lobbying, (the national security portion of the budget is affected 
by the lobbying of defense contractors and the advocates for support to other 
countries). 
Generally, these forces cause the national defense and international affairs portions 
of the budget to increase and decrease together; however, this is not always the case. This 
thesis examines how closely the defense and international affairs budgets correlate and 
proposes viable reasons for the differences that do occur. 
The U. S. government's budget is an expression of priorities. The money allotted 
to a function shows the importance assigned to that aspect of the budget. As Charles 
Schultze states, "The annual budget is a package of the most important and 
comprehensive decisions on priorities which the society makes in the course of a year." 
(Benson and Wolman, 1971, p. 4) This overall total is a representation of the combined 
priorities of the government officials involved which in turn are affected by the desires of 
the general public. (Chapter II gives a theoretical support for this assumption.) 
My hypothesis is that international affairs budget is driven more by economic 
concerns of the nation and the defense budget is driven more by the national perception of 
the current international situation and of the external threats to the United States. 
The international affairs budget should be affected more by the state of the 
economy because Congress finds it difficult to approve programs that send U.S. tax 
dollars overseas during periods of economic hardship at home. In an atmosphere of 
budget cuts, the State Department has a very hard time defending budget line items to be 
sent to other nations while cuts are being taken in domestic programs. (The foreign aid 
portion of the international affairs budget ranges from two-thirds to four-fifths of the 
total.) 
The defense budget is easier to defend than foreign aid in a fiscally tight Congress 
because of the direct correlation between cuts in military expenditures (especially 
personnel and large contracts) and increased unemployment. Increases in the military 
t
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budget usually correspond to the perception of threat and the importance of foreign policy 
issues. For example, the Reagan administration tied its requests for a drastic rise in 
defense spending to what it called the security "gap" with the Soviets. 
Part of the hypothesis studied in this thesis is the influence of public opinion on 
policy. Public opinion's affect on policy decisions has been debated through the years. 
This thesis seeks to prove that public opinion does affect the final outcome of the budget. 
B.        METHODOLOGY 
This thesis studies the influences on the defense and international affairs budgets by 
using a time series regression. The regression was run using Eviews, MicroTSP for 
Windows, a program published by Quantitative Micro Software. 
1. Dependent Variables 
In the regression analysis, the dependent variables are the post W.W.II budgets 
listed under the budget functions of national defense (function code 050) and international 
affairs (function code 150) as listed in the Historical Tables: Budget of the United States 
Government Fiscal Year 1996 collated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
as part of the annual budget submission to Congress. Using this breakdown by code 
ensures the closest consistency possible in the data used. The post W.W.II period was 
chosen because this time was the beginning of the first significant international assistance 
given by the United States. Using the 1995 OMB publication as a sole source of the 
budget data provides for consistent data collection, and decreases the likelihood of errors 
affecting the analysis. 
t
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2. Independent Variables 
The three main independent variables used in this study are the nation's economic 
concerns, the nation's focus, and the international situation. The primary measure for each 
of these variables is polling data. The final decisions about the budget are made by elected 
officials who are influenced by their own views and perceptions of the direction of public 
opinion. Polls are one of the major indicators of these perceptions. (See Chapter II for a 
further explanation of the linkage between policy and public opinion.) 
The first independent variable included in this study is the nation's perception of 
the current state of the economy. This variable measures the pressure on elected officials 
to modify the budget and thereby adjust the national economy. After the massive 
spending of WWII pulled the U.S. out of the Great Depression, the view of the role of 
government in the economy changed. A strong and active government was viewed as a 
necessity in order to balance the economy, especially unemployment and inflation. This 
pressure for government to take responsibility for the state of the economy dominated 
most of the period being studied. Thomas Lynch even states, "in the mid-1960s and 
1970s, economic theory guided some of our most significant government decisions." 
(Lynch, 1990, p. 25) National perceptions vice actual economic data are used because the 
budget is based on people's reactions to economic conditions and not calculated directly 
from statistics. The importance of government officials paying more attention to the 
perceptions of their constituents than actual economic statistics can be seen in the severe 
dive that President Bush took in popularity when the nation felt that the economy was 
headed for a recession and the president did not act because his advisors said the numbers 
didn't support such a belief. If the nation is concerned about the state of the economy, it 
pressures lawmakers to make changes in the budget to improve the economy. The public 
opinion about the state of the economy is an indication of the amount of pressure on 





The second independent variable, the country's focus, represents the issues that the 
nation feels should receive the highest priority. Budget items are especially affected by the 
perceived priority given to the project. The higher the perceived importance of the 
proposal the more likely it is to be funded. When international issues are perceived as the 
highest priority, national defense and international affairs should receive a higher portion 
of the budget. 
The polling question used to represent the nation's focus is "What is the most 
important problem facing the nation today?" The answers are separated into three 
different categories: national security issues, economic issues, and miscellaneous. (A 
further description can be found in Chapter III.) Attention to national security issues 
indicates that they are considered to be a priority and should lead to increased spending on 
national security budget items. 
The third independent variable is the perception of the international system. This 
variable is more difficult to measure.   Polling data regarding the peaceful or troubled 
nature of the international scene and the perceptions of the U.S. role in world affairs are 
analyzed. These polling questions were not asked each year of this study, so two 
additional objective measures are used. The level of international tension based on a 
measure used for a previous study and U.S. participation in a war are coded for each year. 
(See Chapter III for further details.) These measures represent the actual international 
situation at the time of the budget debate. 
The perception of the international situation as troubled or peaceful affects the 
priority given to protection at home (military spending) and reducing threats abroad. The 
link between the perception of threat and the international affairs budget is less clear. The 
perception of the role of the U.S. in world affairs shows the strength of the internationalist 
focus and should influence the priority given to defense and international affairs. 
The effect of election year politics and party influence is also considered as a 
possible explanation for the variance in the data. 
t
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Overall, international affairs should be effected more by economic concerns at 
home and defense should be influenced more by the current international situation and the 
nation's focus. Party should have no appreciable influence. 
There are other influences on the budget process. This study assumes that these 
influences are either close to being equal from year to year like lobbyist pressure or equal 
on both the military and international affairs budget like the Gramm-Rudman Act. 
C.        ASSUMPTIONS 
The first assumption of this thesis is that there is a limited budget and that 
departments do not automatically get what is requested. There are constraints and 
decisions that must be made regarding where money will be spent. 
The second assumption is that public opinion polls are an accurate reflection of the 
constituent influences on the federal government and that Congress and the President have 
access to and are knowledgeable of the results of these polls. 
7 
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II. PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter establishes a link between public opinion and public policy.   The 
budget is one of the most important elements of public policy decided each year. If policy 
is affected by the opinion of constituents, then the budget must also be affected by this 
pressure. 
B. GENERAL THEORETICAL STUDIES 
The most commonly referred to study that establishes a link between elected 
officials and constituents was conducted by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes of the 
University of Michigan in 1963. (Miller and Stokes, 1963, pp. 45-56) Miller and Stokes 
compared the policy preferences of constituents and congressional Representatives of 116 
districts in three areas: social welfare, foreign affairs, and civil rights. This study 
postulates that the relationship between constituent attitude and the Representative's roll 
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Figure 1. Model of Constituency Influence by Miller and Stokes 
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Miller and Stokes state there are two ways which constituencies can influence 
policy. First, since the Representative is chosen from the local area, the Representative 
will hold some of the same policy values as the local population. The voters elect a 
candidate who espouses views that agree with the constituency's will. Second, after 
elected, the Representative may take into account the preferences and view of his or her 
constituency in order to win re-election. 
This study concludes, "Our evidence shows that the Representative's roll call 
behavior is strongly influenced by his own policy preferences and by his perceptions of 
preferences held by the constituency." (Miller and Stokes, 1963, p. 56) 
In 1966, Charles F. Cnuddle and Donald J. McCrone published a study that refined 
Miller and Stokes model. (Cnuddle and McCrone, pp. 66-72) This modification is shown 
in Figure 2 and discounts the importance of the link between the views of the constituents 











Figure 2. Model of Constituency Influence by Cnuddle and McCrone 
This study states that the constituency's influence in the roll call voting is mainly 
through the Representative's perceptions of the constituency's attitude. "Congressmen 
vote their constituencies' attitudes (as they perceive them) with a mind to the next 
election." (Cnuddle and McCrone, p. 69) Their conclusions are: 
1. The lack of a direct link between congressmen's attitudes and district 
attitudes indicates that elite recruitment is not the basis for constituency control. 
2. Unlike the private citizen, the Congressman does not distort his 
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are so high for an elected official, his perceptions are likely to cause him to modify 
his attitudes to fit his reasonably accurate perceptions. 
3. The overwhelmingly important impact of Congressmen's perceptions in 
linking mass attitudes to policy-making as indicated by Miller and Stokes, is 
confirmed. 
4. The relative importance of the indirect impact of perception through 
congressional attitudes was underestimated in the original study. (Cnuddle and 
McCrone, pp. 71 and 72) 
If Cnuddle and McCrone's conclusions are correct then polling data as a 
representation of public opinion should show a strong correlation to policy choices. 
Robert S. Erikson re-analyzed the Miller-Stokes data in 1978. He concluded that 
"compared to the benchmark of what would have happened with random election results, 
the correlation between constituency opinion and the attitudes of actual winners are 
impressive evidence that constituency voting behavior enhances representation." (Robert 
S. Erikson, 1978, p. 528) Further, Erikson states that: 
There appears to be more congressional representation of constituency 
opinion than has previously been realized. There appear to be several sources for 
this evident representation. In part, the representation occurs because 
Representatives respond to correctly perceived constituency opinion. But 
constituencies influence their Representatives' issue attitudes as well. This process 
is partially involuntary — the result of Representatives being members of their own 
constituencies. More importantly, constituencies control their Representatives' 
attitudes via their electoral behavior ~ by responding to the policy cues provided by 
the candidates' parry affiliations and the candidates' policy positions. (Erikson, p. 
532) 
A fourth more recent study in 1983 comes to a similar conclusion. Benjamin I. 
Page and Robert Y. Shapiro of the University of Chicago studied the responsiveness of 
government policies to citizens' preferences and found "considerable congruence between 
changes in preferences and in policies, especially for large, stable changes on salient issues 
. . . public opinion is often the proximate cause of policy, affecting policy more than policy 
influences opinion." (Page and Shapiro, 1983, p. 175) Page and Shapiro also found that 
there was "little difference among the executive, Congress or even the federal courts; for 









There have been several criticisms of these studies. The first concern deals with 
the amount of knowledge the general public has regarding the issues being decided by the 
Congress and the executive branch. Miller and Stokes address this concern by stating that 
"what makes it possible to compare the policy preferences of constituents and 
Representatives despite the public's low awareness of legislative affairs is the fact that 
Congressmen themselves respond to many issues in terms of fairly broad evaluative 
dimensions." (Miller and Stokes, p. 47) 
Some of the later studies also address this question of constituency knowledge. 
Russett (1990) states "new research demonstrates that foreign policy issues [most 
frequently cited as those of the lowest interest and knowledge to the public] were salient 
to the public, and influential to voting, in most post-World War II elections." (Russett, 
1990, p. 90) Page and Shapiro directly take the public's interest into account in their 
study. The influence of public opinion was shown to be greater on issues where the 
proportion of respondents answering "don't know" was small. (Page and Shapiro, p. 181) 
Other critics question direction of influence between policy and public opinion. 
They state that the president and Congress shape and manipulate public opinion, not react 
to it. As stated above some of the more recent work has refuted this claim, notably Page 
and Shapiro (1983), Chapter IV of Controlling the Sword by Russett, Chapter II of 
People, Polls and Policymakers by Hinckley and an article by Hartley and Russett (1992) 
that specifically examines public opinion and military spending. These studies 
acknowledge that the relationship between public opinion and policy is not a simple one. 
Current policy choices will affect future public opinion and occasionally politicians can 
influence public opinion to support legislation already approved. In examining this 
relationship, Page and Shapiro found that "a high proportion of the changes in public 
opinion since 1935 did in fact occur before congruent changes in policy." (Page and 
Shapiro, p. 185) 
Another criticism leveled at the early studies addressing the effect of public opinion 
is the sample size used. Miller-Stokes used a small number of cases. This consideration 




Monroe's (1978) work has suggested that there is considerable—though far from 
complete—consistency between opinion and policy, especially for foreign policy and highly 
salient issues." (Page and Shapiro, p. 176) 
These studies show that there is a definite linkage between public opinion and 
national policy decisions. Most of the studies concentrate on congressional decision 
making but as Hinckley states: 
It is clear that politicians in both the White House and on Capitol Hill do 
rank polls revealing public opinion very high as a source of information important 
to decision making. In the Washington of the late twentieth century, one's 
popularity and/or the popularity of the issues one espouses defines one's political 
power. Elected officials cannot do much without popular support, and for that 
reason alone, public opinion is part of the power game in American national politics, 
including foreign policymaking. (Hinckley, p. 46) 
In contrast to earlier studies, most of the more recent studies indicate that U.S. 
governmental policy is affected by public opinion. The results of this thesis should shed 
some additional light on the debate over the influence of public opinion on governmental 
policy choices. 
C.        NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND PUBLIC OPINION 
Foreign policy attitudes among most Americans lack intellectual structure and factual 
content. Such superficial psychic states are bound to be unstable since they are not anchored 
in a set of explicit value and means calculations or traditional compulsions. 
-Gabriel A. Almond 
".Almond's (1950) research indicated that most U.S. citizens knew very little about 
the remote issues of foreign policy and instead focused their attention on domestic policies 
. . . This view continues to be widely held today, and as a consequence studies of public 
opinion and voting tend to focus on domestic issues." (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 
1989, p. 123) Until recently, this view of the public's lack of knowledge and interest in 
national security has led many studies of the public's influence on American policy 
formation to discount or ignore national security issues, namely foreign and defense 










The studies in the 1960s appeared to confirm a low correlation between 
constituency opinion and foreign policy decisions. The Miller-Stokes study states: 
Congressman looks elsewhere than to his district in making up his mind on 
foreign issues. However, the reliance he puts on the President and the 
Administration suggests that the calculation of where the public interest lies is often 
passed to the Executive on matters of foreign policy. (Miller and Stokes, p. 56) 
More recent studies have come to a different conclusion. Page and Shapiro found 
little difference in the effect of public opinion between foreign and domestic issues.1 "One 
expected kind of variation in congruence, a difference between domestic and foreign 
issues, does not even occur at the simple bivariate level." (Page and Shapiro, p. 182) 
Ronald H. Hinckley goes even further and "emphasizes the role that public opinion 
plays in national security policymaking and suggests that public opinion has become part 
of the decision-making process . . . public opinion polls have gained such acceptance in 
recent years that 'opinion polls are at the core of presidential decision making.'" 
(Hinckley, p. 4) His study examines in-depth the influence public attitudes have on "major 
contemporary foreign policy events and issues" (Hinckley, p. xv) and he concludes that: 
Public opinion matters in foreign policymaking. Democratic theory alone 
suggests that policymakers ought to be responsive to the people. Furthermore, in 
American politics at the close of the twentieth century, the findings of public 
opinion polls are introduced into almost all major national security discussions, if 
not by the participants, then by the media. (Hinckley, p. 139) 
Even though most of these studies focus on the influence of the public on 
Congress, the Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida study indicated that the public's views on 
foreign policy has also played an important role in presidential elections. "We can 
conclude that in the elections for which we have appropriate data, attitudes about foreign 
affairs have been consequential." (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida, p. 135) 
1
 This difference may be explained by the fact that Miller-Stokes only studied one election 









One specific example of the influence of public opinion on foreign policy is sighted 
in Page and Shapiro: 
A more striking case of policy following the lead of opinion was the United 
States' support for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. 
Support among Americans for admission rose 33 percentage points from January 
1964 to May 1971, with a 13 percentage-point shift by 1966. Had public 
preferences not shifted, the Nixon administration very well might not have altered 
U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China. (Page and Shapiro, p. 187) 
1. Public Opinion and Defense Spending 
Noteworthy research done regarding the impact of public opinion on the national 
security portion of the budget has focused on one specific aspect: defense spending.2 
Charles W. Ostrom and Robin F. Marra show linkages between the President's budget 
request, congressional legislation, Department of Defense expenditures and the public's 
opinion for or against increased military spending. "The estimated version of the model 
provides evidence that public opinion concerning the appropriate magnitude of the U.S. 
defense effort plays an important role in U.S. defense expenditure policy making." 
(Ostrom and Marra, 1986, p. 838) 
Russett clearly states that "preferences for change in military expenditures . . . 
corresponded fairly closely to changes in actual military spending in constant 1987 dollars 
. . . Analysis of the data suggests that decisions about military spending usually respond to 
public opinion." (Russett, 1990, p. 99) Another similar study was done in 1992 at Yale 
University by Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett that confirms the influence of public 
opinion on actual defense spending. 
Even controlling for the effects of other factors that concern policymakers, 
we find that public opinion exerts an effect on military spending in a way that is 
substantially plausible as a cause. With other influences held constant, we find that 
if the percentage of public opinion favoring increases in military spending rises, 
then the level of military spending will increase. Conversely, if the percentage of 
public opinion opposing increases in military spending rises, then actual spending 










tends to come down. It is important to note that these effects were systematic over 
the time period that we studied, not occasional effects too erratic to result in a 
statistically significant regression coefficient. (Hartley and Russett, p. 905) 
All of these studies indicate that while public opinion influences military spending, 
its influence is less than the influence of a change in Soviet military spending (as measured 
in the study). As Hartley and Russett conclude "the influence of public opinion is less 
important than either Soviet military spending or the gap between U.S. and Soviet military 
spending and more important than the deficit and the balance of Soviet 
conflict/cooperation with the United States." (Hartley and Russett, p. 905) 
In a specific study that did not take Soviet spending into account, Larry M. Bartels 
used public opinion to account for the Reagan defense buildup of the early 1980s. He 
ascertained: 
The strong aggregate constituency demand for increased defense spending 
in 1980 is estimated to have added almost $17 billion (about 10%) to the total fiscal 
year 1982 Pentagon appropriation. The impact of constituency opinion was largely 
independent of specific political circumstances: Differential responsiveness in 
districts with partisan turnover, intense district level competition, and strong 
presidential coattails together accounted for less than $ 1 billion in additional 
appropriations, with the remaining $ 16 billion attributable to across-the -board 
responsiveness by even the most safely incumbent representatives. (Bartels, 1991, 
p. 457) 
D.        PUBLIC OPINION'S INFLUENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
FOREIGN POLICY 
As recent studies have shown, public opinion does have an influence in public 
policy, in general and national security, specifically. 
1. Background 
One factor that must be considered in this study is the fact that public opinion's 
influence over national security issues has changed over the years. Before addressing a 




    
        
     
         






the various outlooks on the direction of foreign policy. There are two classic approaches 
to foreign policy: isolationism and interventionism (internationalism). Isolationists believe 
that the nation should focus on domestic matters such as employment, inflation, crime, and 
the environment. Involvement in international matters only detracts from the primary 
focus. Internationalists, on the other hand, believe that the United States has an obligation 
to exert its influence on the international scene. 
This breakdown had been further refined by Wittkopf which based his definitions 
on the initial work of Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau. The following are the refined 
definitions of four basic attitudinal types: 
* Isolationists are Americans who oppose almost any kind of involvement in 
international affairs. 
* Accommodationists favor involvement in international affairs, believe in 
cooperating with other nations, and shun military intervention. 
* Internationalists also favor international involvement but believe that 
cooperation has its limits and that it may be necessary in particular cases to 
unilaterally use military force. 
* Hardliners favor international involvement but oppose cooperation, instead 
supporting more unilateralist action and military intervention. (Hinckley, p. 10) 
2. Changes in Political Climate from W.W.I to the 1950s 
Pre-World War II attitudes were dominated by isolationism. After W.W.II the 
changing international order led to a drastic adjustment in the attitude of the United States' 
citizenry. "Pearl Harbor, Nazi atrocities, the atomic bomb, and the emergence of the 
Soviet Union and China as world powers convinced Americans that they could not adhere 
to isolationism." (Hinckley, p. 13)   The nation became internationalists. The United 
States was seen as the leader of the West in a new cold war world. 
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There were several changes in the international arena during the late 1950s and 
1960s. Soviet power and influence grew to directly challenge the United States. Europe 
and Japan recovered and began to reassert influence in world affairs. Finally, the Third 
world nations began to band together and become a world player. These systemic 
changes, combined with the multitude of problems the United States experienced due to 
the Vietnam war, brought about a decline in the absolute power the United States could 
exert on the international scene. These changes splintered the internationalist stronghold 
on the thoughts of the nation. The nation no longer had a clear national security direction. 
3. Changes in Political Climate since the 1960s 
Up through the early 1960s, the studies regarding public opinion's influence on 
foreign policy showed little correlation (see Miller-Stokes) to policy changes and some 
studies even indicated that the general public had little knowledge or interest in 
international affairs (see Almond). With the advent of the Vietnam War, this perception 
began to change. The pattern is clearly shown in Page and Shapiro's findings in 1983: 
The frequency of congruence has varied in different historical periods: there 
was more in the 1970s than in the Eisenhower years or the Kennedy Johnson years, 
and the level was about average from 1935 through 1952. But before concluding 
that government was intrinsically more responsive during Nixon, Ford and Carter 
administrations, we should note that there has been a trend toward a better-educated 
citizenry and greater issue salience, concurrent with the rise of important new social 
issues. (Page and Shapiro, p. 182) 
Bartels noted in his study that the general attitude among political scholars that the 
public is uninformed and apathetic about defense and foreign affairs "appears since the late 
1970s to have become increasingly untenable. In 1980 about one third of the public 
mentioned defense and foreign policy issues as the nation's most important problem and 
more people correctly characterized the relative positions of Reagan and Carter on the 
issue of defense spending than on any other issue." (Bartels, p. 459) 
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The public has increased its influence on public policy especially in the area of 
national security since the late 1960s. One example of this influence was referred to in 
Russett's book: 
At one point in Reagan's second term, [Mike] Deaver and Nancy Reagan 
reportedly used polls showing American's waning enthusiasm for defense spending 
to persuade the president to reduce his proposed military budget. 
This change in the importance of public opinion for national security issues is 
evident in the reactions of bureaucratic government officials as well. In Hinckley's book, 
he notes that a different attitude toward public opinion had grown in the State 
Department: 
In State's Bureau of Public Affairs, the Office of Opinion Analysis 
synthesizes all types of polling data for the secretary and distributes scores of 
information memoranda outlining public opinions on various foreign policy topics. 
This is a far different atmosphere from that found by Bernard C. Cohen in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. He noted that the prevailing attitude was that public 
opinion was irrelevant and pointless for State officials and that their basic outlook 
was. 'to hell with public opinion.' (Hinckley, p. 4) 
As the importance of public opinion in foreign policy increased, so did the 
intervention of the Congress into areas normally the realm of the Executive branch. Sean 
Lynn-Jones expounds on this change: 
Since the late 1960s the U.S. Congress has played an increasingly active 
role in defense and arms control policy and has asserted greater power vis-ä-vis the 
Executive Branch. The evidence of this trend can be seen in the increased oversight 
that Congress has exercised over defense budgets and arms control agreements . . . 
In 1969, for example, Congress made 180 changes to the defense authorization bill 
and 650 to the appropriations bill. By 1985, the number of adjustments had 
increased to 1,145 and 2,156, respectively. (Lynn-Jones, 1990) 
E.       INFERENCES 
Public opinion has a definite impact on the direction of public policy in the United 
States. This influence appears to have grown in the last few decades especially in the area 






The influence of public opinion is not universal and is confined to overarching 
policy direction. Russett comments on this influence: 
Public opinion sets broad limits of constraint, identifying a range of policies 
within which decision makers can choose, and within which they must choose if they 
are not to face rejection in the voting booths.... A major instrument of popular 
influence in the United States may often operate through congressional readings of 
public opinion and then through legislators' influence on the executive. Public 
opinion may be more effective as elections draw near. In an era of 'permanent 
plebiscite' conducted by polls and electronic media, however the interaction of 
public opinion and exercises of political drama by governmental leaders is a 
continuing phenomenon. (Russett, p. 110) 
The reasons for the increased influence could be varied. Some postulate that the 
Vietnam War and decreasing confidence in the government has led to increased voter 
interest in the affairs of government. Others link the increased power of public opinion to 
technology changes as Hinckley states: 
Some discussion is warranted as the reasons why mass public opinion has 
become so directly linked to policy formation. The information revolution has 
eroded the interest group dimension of public opinion. New information-transfer 
technologies in the mass media, telecommunications, and the computer industry 
have increased the flow of information directly to individuals. (Hinckley, p. 6) 
In the final analysis, it is important to acknowledge the impact of public opinion on 
policy decisions and to use the information available when attempting to understand the 
dynamics of policy decision making. As Hinckley states: 
I believe that public opinion has been defined and has become 
institutionalized in the American political process through and by opinion polls. 
Therefore, whether one thinks it is appropriate or not to measure public opinion 
through polls or that such findings should be considered by policymakers, the fact of 
the matter is that polls are conducted, their results are offered as public opinion, and 
this opinion is often used in the policy process. (Hinckley, p. xvi) 
This thesis examines the effect that various opinion influences have on the two 
main portions of the U.S. national security portion of the budget. A clearer understanding 
of the driving forces behind the national security budget will help policymakers address the 
question that now faces the United States -- what effect has end of the cold war had on 






III. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIONS 
Tables containing the values for the independent and dependent variables can be 
found in Appendix A. 
A.       DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
As stated in Chapter I, the dependent variables, national defense budget and 
international affairs budget, are taken from the Historical Tables: Budget of the United 
States Government Fiscal Year 1996 as collated by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). The data was gathered from 1946 to 1994. The starting data point was chosen 
to exclude World War II but include the period of movement of the United States into the 
international scene as the major player. During the analysis, the huge expenditures of the 
Marshall Plan on the international affairs budget greatly skewed the results, so the 
regressions for the international affairs budget is run only using the data from 1952 to 
1994. 
The time-series regression is run evaluating a zero, one and two year lag for the 
independent variables to influence the dependent variables.3 The previous research in the 
area of public opinion influence on policy indicated that a one year lag showed the most 
correlation. (Page and Shapiro, 1983, p. 177.) This thesis finds that each independent 
variable shows a stronger relationship at different lag periods, although the difference 
between years for most of the variables is small. (See Appendix B for further details.) 
This lag may be explained by the time it takes for the elected officials to assimilate the 
contituency's preferences. 
3
 The data considered is listed by fiscal year.   This representation is one year after the 
budget was voted on. A zero lag is considered to be comparing the independent variables with data 
from the year the budget was voted on. Thus a zero lag would compare the FY1990 budget figures 








B.       INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Since one of the purposes of this thesis is to evaluate the influence of public 
opinion on policy decisions, polling data is the primary measure used to represent the 
independent variables. The polling data samples the general public's attitudes on a regular 
basis and is readily available to policy makers. 
Public concern about the state of the economy is measured by the Consumer 
Sentiment Index compiled by the University of Michigan, Survey Research Center.4 The 
data was taken from the Survey of Current Business published by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. This index is based on a survey that asks respondents to rate their financial 
situation and to assess future U.S. business conditions on three categories: 
* Up, better, or good. 
* Same, no change, or uncertain. 
* Down, worse, or bad. 
The data measuring the nation's foreign focus and the polling measures of the 
international situation are gathered from the Gallup Poll found in The Gallup Poll: Public 
Opinion, Annual Series; and The Gallup Poll Monthly. The polling question measuring 
the foreign focus variable asks individuals, "what do you think is the most important 
problem facing this country today?"5 The combined responses to this question show the 
priority given to specific concerns. In order to simplify the evaluation of the data for this 
thesis, the answers to this question are placed into three categories: foreign and military 
"Additional detail about this survey can be found in The Handbook of Cyclical Indicators 
published by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1984, pages 20-21. 
-This wording is the most commonly used one. There were minor variations in the form of 
the question. A complete listing of these variations can be found in an article written by Tom W. 
Smith, "The Polls: America's Most Important Problems; Part I: National and InternationaU'Public 
Opinion Quarterly 49, p. 267-268. 
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related, economic, and other. Included in the "foreign and military" category are 
references to war, peace, international relations, foreign affairs, national defense, and 
military preparedness. The "economic" category includes mentions of inflation, cost of 
living, poverty, food, shelter, farm problems, strikes, unemployment, jobs, cost of 
government, national debt, and taxes. All responses (i.e., race, drugs, or energy) that did 
not clearly fall into either category are placed in the "other" category. The information 
regarding this question is gathered from published Gallup Poll sources for all years from 
1946 to 1994. No datum is available for three years (1952, 1960 and 1961) in the 
published Gallup material. There are 111 instances of the "Most Important Problem" 
question listed in the Gallup Poll publications during this period. The responses for each 
individual question are added up according to the stipulated categories and divided by the 
total number of responses.6 The percentages in the foreign category for one year are 
averaged together to produce a composite number for each year of the covered period. 
The second variable measured by survey results is the international situation. The 
polling data for this variable is sketchy. The first polling question used asks "do you think 
it would be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or 
if we stay out of world affairs?" This data set was available from 1946 to 1991 with a gap 
of information from 1957 to 1972 and a total of 24 years represented. The second 
question used to represent this variable is "do you think that [the next year] will be a 
peaceful year more or less free of international disputes, a troubled year with much 
international discord or remain the same?"7 The data set used for this variable is the 
number of "troubled" answers. It is assumed that there will be no pressure to increase the 
national security portion of the budget if the public believes that the future will be more 
"peaceful" or will "remain the same".   Of the forty-nine years included in this study, data 
on this question is available in the Gallup Poll for only eighteen years with most of the 
6Multiple responses were given to the "most important problem" question. The total number 
of responses varied from 100-249. 








data in the 1970s and 1980s. The polling data about the public's impression of the 
likelihood of war and the Soviets increasing in power was not in sufficient quantity to be 
able to include it in this study. 
To supplement the sparse polling data, a measure of the international tension 
itself is used. Rather than develop a separate coding system based on limited knowledge, 
one from a previous study of defense spending was used. This measure is in an article by 
Farid Abolfathi, "Threat, Public Opinion and Military Spending in the United States, 1930- 
1990." (McGowan, pp. 83-133) It uses a scale of zero to three. Zero represents "no 
significant international conflicts affecting U.S. interests" and three represents "extremely 
high tension levels." (McGowan, p. 90) The coding stopped at 1979, so additional 
coding, based on the original concept, is created to bring the data set to 1994. 
A third measure of the international situation is the state of war for the United 
States. The conflicts that are considered to be a war during this period are the Korean 
War, Vietnam War, and the Gulf Conflict. A simple representation is used: 
* No war = 0 
* U.S. involved in a war part of the year or only partial commitment = 0.5 
* U.S. involved in a war all year = 1 
A final variable considered is the effect of a party's control of the government. 
For each year the control of the Congress and the presidency is coded. A code of three 
indicates that the Democrats had control of both Houses of Congress and the presidency 
for that year. A code of zero means that the Republicans had control of all three. 
The hypotheses of this thesis expects different influences for each of these 
independent variables.  The nation's foreign focus and the international situation should 
influence the defense budget more than the international affairs budget. The economic 
outlook should influence international affairs more than defense. The party variable is 









IV. OUTCOME OF THE ANALYSIS 
Overall, the hypotheses are confirmed by the regression analysis. (See Appendix B 
for the regression analysis tables.) 
The nation's focus variable using the foreign and military category of the "most 
important problem" polling question is positively correlated with both defense and 
international affairs budgets. The defense and international affairs budgets are significantly 
influenced by the nation's foreign policy focus (adjusted R2= 0.68 and 0.55, respectively.) 
The beta coefficients of 0.76 and 0.65 show that the nation's foreign focus has the 
strongest effect on the budgets compared to the other variables.   The more the nation 
sees foreign concerns as the "most important problem" the higher the percentage of the 
budget is devoted to national security. The influence of the nation's foreign focus does 
seem to influence the defense budget a little more than the international affairs budget as 
evidenced by the stronger adjusted R2 for defense. 
The effect of the international situation on the budget is distinct for each dependent 
variable. For defense, the polling data used are insufficient indicators of the direction the 
budget would take. The strongest association was a weak positive relationship (adjusted 
R2= 0.11) between the view that the U.S. should play an active part in world affairs and 
increases in the percentage allocated to defense. The beta coefficient for this variable is 
equal to the influence exhibited by both economic outlook and war. The polling data 
regarding the perception of a "troubled year" did not influence the defense budget at all. 
The defense budget appears to be strongly influenced by the variables measuring 
the actual international conditions: tension and war. There is a positive correlation 
(adjusted R2= 0.40 and 0.16, respectively) between the percentage of the defense budget 
and a rise in the level of international tension and the involvement in war. The beta 
coefficient for international tension (0.63) is not quite double the coefficient for war (0.40) 
indicating that international tension is a stronger indicator of changes in the percentage 








The international affairs budget also shows a significant correlation (0.38) to the 
international tension but not the war variable. The international affairs budget is weakly 
correlated to both polling measures of the international situation. (Adjusted R2 for "active 
part in the world' - 0.14 and for "troubled world' -0.12.) 
The hypothesis that is unable to be confirmed is the influence of the nation's 
economic outlook. The attitude of the country regarding the economy, as measured by 
the Consumer Sentiment Index, did show a weak correlation with both defense and 
international affairs budget.   As the nation became more concerned about the economy 
the percentage of the budget devoted to both defense and international affairs decline. 
The relative influence of the nation's economic outlook on the two budgets is unknown 
because of the high correlation between the various independent variables (see Table 5 of 
Appendix B) and the closeness of the single regression adjusted R2 :defense = 0.20 and 
international affairs = 0.18. The high correlation between variables prevents a comparison 
of the strength of the influence over the defense vs. the international affairs budget and a 
true testing of this portion of the hypothesis. The beta coefficient for defense (0.41) 
shows that the nation's economic outlook influences the defense budget as much as war or 
the perception of the role of the U.S. in world affairs. For the international affairs budget, 
the beta coefficient of economic outlook (0.27) is about the same as the two measures of 
the perception of the international situation. 
The influence of the economy on the budget shown in this thesis confirms a similar 
result found in a study done by Kamlet and Mowery where they state that "the influence of 
economic conditions on budgetary outcomes is strong but varies considerably across 
spending categories." (Kamlet and Mowery, 1987, p.  155) 
Most variables have a lesser effect on the international affairs budget. This may be 
due to the fact that the percentage of the budget given to international affairs is small and 
therefore does not vary to the same extent that defense does. 
Party control of the government did not show any relationship to either the defense 
or the international affairs budgets. 
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These results confirm most of the hypotheses of this thesis. The defense budget is 
clearly influenced by the nation's focus on foreign problems and the current international 
situation. Public opinion does play a role in the priority given to defense spending 
confirming the studies of Ostrom and Marra, Bruce Russett, and Larry Bartels. This 
thesis determined that public opinion also has an effect on the percentage of the 
international affairs budget. 
The multiple regressions run with the percentage of defense and international 
affairs budgets8 also showed a very high association with the independent variables 
(adjusted R2= 0.83 and 0.77, respectively; see Appendix B, Tables 3 and 4). Because of 
the high correlation between the various independent variables (see Appendix B, Table 5), 
a time-series multiple regression that included both foreign focus and economic outlook 
was not run. The correlation among the independent variables probably inflated the 
measure of association in the regressions. 
Even accepting that the adjusted R2 is artificially high, the multiple regressions do 
indicate that the independent variables explain a large portion of the changes in the 
percentage of the budget allocated to defense and international affairs. 
The multiple regression run evaluating the influences on the defense budget shows 
the importance of the nation's focus, international tension and the state of war. (See 
Appendix B, Table C.) The multiple regression with the highest association evaluating the 
international affairs budget showed influences by the nation's foreign focus, international 
tension, and the perception of a troubled year ahead. 
Based on the residuals of the equations, the regressions are best at predicting the 
national security budget in the 1970s and 1980s. (See Appendix B.) This may indicate 
that public opinion has had more influence since the Vietnam War. 
"The two multiple regressions reported in this thesis are those that possess the highest 











This analysis clearly shows the importance of public opinion as well as actual 
international conditions on the national security portions of the budget. The breakdown of 
these influences on the defense and international affairs budgets, two competing 
nondiscretionary funds, can assist in the active procurement of an additional percentage of 
the budget for national security issues. 
Many studies had previously addressed the influences that the international 
situation had on the defense budget. This thesis shows that the defense budget is affected 
by changes in the international situation more than the international affairs budget. This 
influence is not simply derived from an assessment of the threat from the Soviet Union 
(i.e., Soviet military spending) as previous studies have shown. (See Hartley and Russett, 
Ostrom and Marra, or Su, Kamlet, and Mowery) There is a strong influence from a 
general tensions worldwide. This may help to provide a basis for estimating future 
budgets in this post cold war era where the threat from the old arch enemy, the Soviet 
Union, is no more. 
The effect of public opinion on the defense budget is strong, especially beginning 
in the late 1960s to present day. The nation's focus on foreign issues, the concern about 
the economy, and to a lesser extent the view of the U.S. role in world affairs contributes 
to the priority given to defense matters in the budget. These issues should be addressed 
by the Department of Defense in its public affairs policies and statements in order to 
increase support for defense spending. 
Some of the significant influences on the international affairs budget are 
determined by this thesis. The nation's concern about foreign issues, the actual 
international tension and perceptions about the state of the economy had the greatest 
effect on the international affairs budget. Public opinion did have a notable influence on 
the percentage of the budget allocated to the international affairs budget. This confirms 
more general research on the public's impact on foreign policy done by Hinckley, Russett, 
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1946 $55,232 $42,681 77.3% $1,935 3.5% 
1947 $34,496 $12,808 37.1% $5,791 16.8% 
1948 $29,764 $9,105 30.6% $4,566 15.3% 
1949 $38,835 $13,150 33.9% $6,052 15.6% 
1950 $42,562 $13,724 32.2% $4,673 11.0% 
1951 $45,514 $23,566 51.8% $3,647 8.0% 
1952 $67,686 $46,089 68.1% $2,691 4.0% 
1953 $76,101 $52,802 69.4% $2,119 2.8% 
1954 $70,855 $49,266 69.5% $1,596 2.3% 
1955 $68,444 $42,729 62.4% $2,223 3.2% 
1956 $70,640 $42,523 60.2% $2,414 3.4% 
1957 $76,578 $45,430 59.3% $3,147 4.1% 
1958 $82,405 $46,815 56.8% $3,364 4.1% 
1959 $92,098 $49,015 53.2% $3,144 3.4% 
1960 $92,191 $48,130 52.2% $2,988 3.2% 
1961 $97,723 $49,601 50.8% $3,184 3.3% 
1962 $106,821 $52,345 49.0% $5,639 5.3% 
1963 $111,316 $53,400 48.0% $5,308 4.8% 
1964 $118,528 $54,757 46.2% $4,945 4.2% 
1965 $118,228 $50,620 42.8% $5,273 4.5% 
1966 $134,532 $58,111 43.2% $5,580 4.1% 
1967 $157,464 $71,417 45.4% $5,566 3.5% 
1968 $178,134 $81,926 46.0% $5,301 3.0% 
1969 $183,640 $82,497 44.9% $4,600 2.5% 
1970 $195,649 $81,692 41.8% $4,330 2.2% 
1971 $210,172 $78,872 37.5% $4,159 2.0% 
1972 $230,681 $79,174 34.3% $4,781 2.1% 
1973 $246,707 $76,681 31.1% $4,149 1.7% 
1974 $269,359 $79,347 29.5% $5,710 2.1% 
1975 $332,332 $86,509 26.0% $7,097 2.1% 
1976 $371,792 $89,619 24.1% $6,433 1.7% 
1977 $409,218 $97,241 23.8% $6,353 1.6% 
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1978 $458,746 $104,495 22.8% $7,482 1.6% 
1979 $503,485 $116,342 23.1% $7,459 1.5% 
1980 $590,947 $133,995 22.7% $12,714 2.2% 
1981 $678,249 $157,513 23.2% $13,104 1.9% 
1982 $745,755 $185,309 24.8% $12,300 1.6% 
1983 $808,380 $209,903 26.0% $11,848 1.5% 
1984 $851,846 $227,413 26.7% $15,876 1.9% 
1985 $946,391 $252,748 26.7% $16,176 1.7% 
1986 $990,336 $273,375 27.6% $14,152 1.4% 
1987 $1,003,911 $281,999 28.1% $11,649 1.2% 
1988 $1,064,140 $290,361 27.3% $10,471 1.0% 
1989 $1,143,172 $303,559 26.6% $9,573 0.8% 
1990 $1,252,705 $299,311 23.9% $13,764 1.1% 
1991 $1,323,441 . $273,292 20.7% $15,851 1.2% 
1992 $1,380,856 $298,350 21.6% $16,107 1.2% 
1993 $1,408,675 $291,086 20.7% $17,248 1.2% 
1994 $1,460,914 $281,563 19.3% $17,083 1.2% 
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1952   1958   1964   1970   1976   1982   1988   1994 
Table 2. Consumer Sentiment Index (Survey of Current Business) 
YEAR INDEX YEAR INDEX YEAR INDEX YEAR INDEX 
1952 86.20 1963 94.80 1974 64.00 1985 93.20 
1953 85.75 1964 99.20 1975 70.50 1986 94.80 
1954 83.97 1965 102.40 1976 85.40 1987 90.60 
1955 99.40 1966 93.80 1977 86.60 1988 94.40 
1956 99.43 1967 94.10 1978 79.40 1989 92.80 
1957 88.30 1968 93.10 1979 66.00 1990 81.60 
1958 83.40 1969 88.20 1980 64.40 1991 77.60 
1959 94.55 1970 76.50 1981 70.70 1992 77.30 
1960 93.97 1971 81.10 1982 68.00 1993 82.80 
1961 92.60 1972 90.40 1983 87.50 1994 92.30 
1962 94.80 1973 76.10 1984 97.50 
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Table 3. Most Important Problem—Foreign/Military Category (Gallup Poll) 












1946 9.01% 1963 41.86% 1980 19.55% 
1947 35.58% 1964 37.24% 1981 5.61% 
1948 51.53% 1965 48.73% 1982 6.37% 
1949 32.38% 1966 47.06% 1983 19.41% 
1950 48.00% 1967 50.51% 1984 22.04% 
1951 55.24% 1968 38.53% 1985 20.97% 
1952 Not Available 1969 36.36% 1986 22.15% 
1953 61.00% 1970 35.40% 1987 19.41% 
1954 40.47% 1971 30.12% 1988 9.00% 
1955 34.88% 1972 30.14% 1989 2.73% 
1956 44.82% 1973 5.85% 1990 9.41% 
1957 37.94% 1974 2.04% 1991 16.73% 
1958 36.30% 1975 2.32% 1992 2.52% 
1959 54.91% 1976 4.16% 1993 3.42% 
1960 Not available 1977 6.00% 1994 3.28% 
1961 Not available 1978 7.49% 
1962 57.80% 1979 4.99% 
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Graph 3. Nation's Economic Outlook and Foreign Focus (1946-1994) 
0   H—l-H-H-H 1 I I 1 H 
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—  Consumer sentiment -*- Foreign Focus 
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Table 4. International Situation Polling Data (Gallup Poll) 
YEAR ACTIVE PART 
IN WORLD 
TROUBLED YEAR YEAR ACTIVE PART 
IN WORLD 
TROUBLED YEAR 
1946 72 Not Available 1971 Not Available Not Available 
1947 68 Not Available 1972 Not Available Not Available 
1948 70 Not Available 1973 66 65 
1949 68 Not Available 1974 66 61 
1950 66 Not Available 1975 61 Not Available 
1951 66 Not Available 1976 63 Not Available 
1952 68 Not Available 1977 Not Available 45 
1953 71 Not Available 1978 59 53 
1954 69 Not Available 1979 Not Available 80 
1955 72 Not Available 1980 Not Available Not Available 
1956 71 Not Available 1981 Not Available 45 
1957 Not Available Not Available 1982 54 32 
1958 Not Available Not Available 1983 65 55 
1959 Not Available 27 1984 65 34 
1960 Not Available Not Available 1985 70 31 
1961 Not Available Not Available 1986 64 35 
1962 Not Available 54 1987 Not Available 25 
1963 Not Available Not Available 1988 Not Available 19 
1964 Not Available Not Available 1989 Not Available 26 
1965 79 57 1990 70 46 
1966 Not Available Not Available 1991 71 Not Available 
1967 Not Available Not Available 1992 Not Available Not Available 
1968 Not Available Not Available 1993 Not Available Not Available 
1969 Not Available Not Available 1994 Not Available Not Available 
1970 Not Available Not Available 
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Table 5. International Situation — Coded Data (after Abolfathi from McGowan and 
Kegley, 1980) 
YEAR TENSION WAR YEAR TENSION WAR 
1946 0.5 0 1971 0.5 
1947 1 0 1972 0.5 0.5 
1948 3 0 1973 0 
1949 2 0 1974 0 
1950 2 0.5 1975 0 
1951 3 1 1976 0 
1952 3 1 1977 0 
1953 3 0.5 1978 0 
1954 2 0 1979 0 
1955 1 0 1980 2 0 
1956 1 0 1981 0 
1957 2 0 1982 0 
1958 2 0 1983 0 
1959 2 0 1984 0.5 0 
1960 3 0 1985 0.5 0 
1961 -» 0 1986 0.5 0 
1962 3 0 1987 0.5 0 
1963 2 0 1988 0.5 0 
1964 1 0 1989 1 0 
1965 2 0.5 1990 2 0 
1966 3 1 1991 2 0.5 
1967 2 1 1992 1 0 
1968 2 1 1993 0.5 0 
1969 1 0.5 1994 0.5 0 
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APPENDIX B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Table 1. Single Regression with Defense Budget Percentage as Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable No. years 
lagged' 




Foreign focus* 1 0.6360 07583 0.0000 0.6799 
Economic concern* 1 0.6356 0.4147 0.0019 0.2008 
International situation: 
-Active part in 
world affairs" 
0 1.2943 0.4157 0.0675 0.1050 
-Troubled year* 2 0.0224 0.0235 0.8654 -0.0605 
-Tension* 2 11.4775 0.6265 0.0000 0.4097 
-WarA 0 18.6856 0.3987 0.0025 0.1638 
Party* 0 2.3540 0.1267 0.3628 -0.0033 
Table 2. Single Regression with International Affairs Budget Percentage as 
Dependent Variable (from 1952) 
Independent Variable No. years 
lagged' 




Foreign focusA 1 0.0439 0.6500 0.0000 0.5493 
Economic concern* 1 0.0510 0.2744 0.0034 0.1789 
International situation: 
- Active part in 
world affairs* 
2 0.0848 0.4045 0.0704 0.1396 
-Troubled yearA 0 0.0272 0.2357 0.0855 0.1219 
-Tension* 2 0.9197 0.6401 0.0000 0.3809 
-War* 0 0.3332 0.0914 0.5581 -0.0161 
Party* 0 0.3418 0.2371 0.1280 0.0334 
9The data for each independent variable is chosen based on which lag demonstrates the 
highest adjusted R2 value. For all variables identified with an asterick (*) the adjusted R2 values for 
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GRAPH 2. Residual for Single Regression: Defense and International Tension 
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GRAPH 4. Residuals for Single Regression: International Affairs and 
International Tension 
-2 l  i  i  |  i  i  i  i  |  i   i   i" i ""|—r  i  i  i   !   i  i  i  i   |  i  i'i   i   | 
55       60       65       70       75       80 
i i i i i i' 
85       90 
Residual Actual Fitted 
43 
 . i ls f r i l  r i : I t r tional ff irs  




I ' I \ 
I \"''' L .... -, f \/,~ " I 1\ 
,,' ~ I .--""\" !\ 
5 
i J\ \. : J \, 1\ ~ \ ' .. -" I \ \. / \ 3 3 \ r-J \ ;{\ \-\ '\ r \ / \ I', \ / \ I 
2 
1 
\ I \ , .... \ --, ,., J \ I 
- y "~~-.A '\.r---,":::-c- ---.. / 






... -.. _ .. _ .......... __ ............. -... -......... -....... _ .. _ ... _ .................................. - 0 
04-~-----------+---7~~r---~~------------; 
-1 
   
-- i l ------- t l ----- F I 
43 
Table 3. Multiple Regression with Defense as the Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic Probability 
Foreign Focus10 0.4207 0.1153 3.6507 0.0022 
Active Part in World 
Affairs 
0.0044 0.3434 0.0129 0.9899 
International Tension" 8.6028 2.3143 3.7171 0.0019 
War 11.4721 5.2635 2.1795 0.0446 
C 38.8645 27.8348 1.3963 0.1796 
Adjusted R2 0.8330 F-Statistic 25.9400 
Durbin-Watson Statistic12 1.6718 Probability (F-Statistic) 0.0000 
Table 4. Multiple Regression with International Affairs as the Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic Probability 
Foreign Focus10 0.0323 0.0100 3.2271 0.0066 
International Tension11 0.8110 0.2094 3.8720 0.0019 
Troubled Year 0.0236 0.0062 3.8189 0.0021 
C -0.5703 0.3522 -1.6196 0.1294 
Adjusted R2 0.7714 F-Statistic 18.9955 
Durbin-Watson Statistic12 1.6602 Probability (F-Statistic) 0.0000 
"Variable was lagged one year. 
"Variable was lagged two years. Zero lag is used for all other variables. 
12Durbin-Watson statistic is within the upper and lower bounds of 5 per cent significance. 
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Foreign Focus 1.0000 0.8706 0.6984 -0.0970 0.2557 0.8287 
Economic 
Outlook 
0.8706 1.0000 0.5894 -0.2989 -0.0154 0.4922 
Active Part in 
World Affairs 
0.6984 0.5894 1.0000 0.2941 0.5031 0.6960 
Troubled Year -0.0970 -0.2989 0.2941 1.0000 0.4599 0.2735 
International 
Tension 
0.2557 -0.0154 0.5031 0.4599 1.0000 0.6066 
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